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A Fair and Equitable Method of Recruitment? Conscription by 
Ballot into the Australian Army during the Vietnam War 
 
Australia’s commitment to the Vietnam War drew on the selective conscription of 
additional manpower through 16 biannual ballots. 20-year-old men were liable to 
serve if their date of birth was drawn out. The random nature of the ballot was seen as 
an equitable method of selection for a system of labour coercion that was potentially 
life-threatening.  We investigate the various stages of conscription of these ‘national 
servicemen’ to undertake service in Vietnam throughout the war and evaluate the 
extent to which the processes provided for fair and equitable selection. Comparisons 
are drawn with a similar process of Vietnam-War era conscription in the United 
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The raising of armies for wartime military engagement has rarely been achieved 
without some degree of coercion. The sudden increase in demand for military labour 
with the outbreak of war often overwhelms the supply of labour in small standing 
armies, and it challenges the ability to extend their ranks sufficiently through 
improved pay and conditions or patriotic appeals to enlist. Conscription, as enforced 
military enlistment is normally termed, has historically taken many forms such as the 
recruitment of serfs and slaves in Medieval Europe, the impressment of coastal 
inhabitants into the British Royal Navy in the eighteenth century, and the raiding of 
Egyptian villages to seize recruits in the nineteenth century.1
Coercion into a service that is potentially life threatening is justified by the 
ultimate national interest of defence of the realm. However, schemes that extend 
beyond defence or whose execution is not viewed as fair and even-handed may 
challenge the legitimacy of conscription. Historically, forced recruitment schemes had 
their foundations in accepted social and political structures and obligations, such as 
the rights and obligations of feudalism. Nonetheless, in some cases, the selection 
process was very arbitrary and resulted in high rates of service evasion. By the 
twentieth century, perhaps in tandem with the development of notions of 
individualism and democracy, there was a move towards the use of more systematic 
and even-handed methods of conscription. Often this has taken the form of universal 
age-based conscription as was the case for many nations engaged in the two World 
Wars.   
 
                                                 
1 Lucassen and Zürcher, Conscription as military labour, pp. 406-9; Lloyd, British Seaman, p. 196; 
Fahmy, Nation and its deserters, p.429.  Although a recent survey estimated that about a half of the 
countries with conscription schemes are not at war. Galiani et al, Conscription and Crime, p. 4. 
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Where manpower needs have fallen short of universal conscription but remained 
above volunteer levels, selective conscription has proved effective in recruiting 
sufficient manpower. Some nations have also used selective conscription to man 
peacetime standing armies. To avoid the arbitrariness of the past, selection processes 
needed to be seen as fair, not discriminating for or against particular groups. Lotteries 
seemingly provided a fairer method of recruitment – their random selection method 
meant that all potential recruits within a cohort, normally age-based, have the same 
probability of being eligible for ‘call up’. As we shall see below, during the Vietnam 
War, Australia and the United States both used a lottery based on birthdays, the latter 
having done likewise in World War Two. Other forms of randomisation have been 
adopted: Argentina operated a conscription lottery from 1901 to 1995 that used the 
last three digits of the national ID number. Mexico has had a lottery system of 
selection since 1940 based on withdrawing a black rather than white ball.2
However, in practice there are mechanisms at each stage of the selection process 
that may violate this sense of fair and equitable treatment. To begin with is the 
selection of eligible age groups for conscription, a figure that has varied over time.
    
3
                                                 
2  Galiani, et al, Conscription and Crime. For an excellent study of the nature and impact of the 1916 
conscription lottery in Brazil, see Beattie, Tribute of Blood 
 
Whether the resulting lottery mechanism effectively provided a random outcome must 
also be considered.  Avoidance and evasion strategies are inevitably pursued before 
and after the ballot result. Following the ballot, only a proportion of those who 
enrolled would eventually enter active service in a field of combat. This was the result 
of a further set of selection processes, regarding enlistment and deployment, that were 
often less transparent and that may have been oriented in favour of particular 
demographic groups within the age cohort. Since the length and intensity of most 
wars are difficult to predict, multiple ballots are often required during the years of 
3  For a discussion of optimal enlistment age see Levy, Optimal enlistment age, pp. 418-25. 
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conflict. The probability of being called up, and indeed facing active service, can vary 
significantly between consecutive ballots depending on changing wartime military 
needs, the size of each consecutive age cohort, and the predictive accuracy of 
manpower projections in previous ballots.   
Thus, while conscription methods may have become fairer over time, in the sense 
of equalising the probability of being selected in a particular ballot, the lottery system 
could lead to very different probabilities of active service both within and between 
ballots. Even if it were possible to equalise the probability of active service between 
ballots, no recruitment strategy can equalise the context of active service faced by 
each cohort, which depends on the waxing and waning of the intensity of the war 
itself.  If military service does play a significant role in shaping the lives of its 
participants, we suggest that, in spite of the use of the ballot to achieve a sense of 
fairness, war can result in very different economic and social outcomes for erstwhile 
identical groups of men. 
We examine these ideas through the lens of Australia’s involvement in the 
Vietnam War, drawing comparisons with American experience in the process. The 
recruitment lottery was designed to bolster Australia’s regular army with National 
Servicemen so that sufficient manpower would be available to participate in the 
Vietnam War. Sixteen biannual lotteries were conducted between 1965 and 1972. 
While selection was by a random process that varied little over the period, the 
probability of active service and its nature and context changed substantially, an 
understanding of which provides an important basis for any attempt to assess the 
economic and social consequences of such a conscription scheme.  We explain below 
the evolution of conscription strategies in twentieth-century Australia. Our focus will 
then be the lottery system of selection, briefly introduced in the late 1950s, but used 
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more extensively during the Vietnam War.  We will describe the dimensions of the 
scheme through to final selection for Vietnam service and analyse the extent to which 
it adhered to the random selection principle within and between ballots. Finally, we 
will assess the variations in wartime service experienced by each of the cohorts that 
ended up in active service. 
 
 
1. THE AUSTRALIAN CONTEXT 
 
Military conscription in Australia did not begin with the Vietnam War.  Table 1 
summarises the details of Australia’s various twentieth century conscription schemes 
In 1903, two years after Federation, the Defence of the Realm Act gave Australian 
governments the right of compulsory recruitment for the purpose of home defence of 
men aged between 18 and 55.  This right was exercised in three conscription schemes 
prior to Vietnam.  Between 1911 and 1929 a scheme of compulsory universal military 
training operated. Junior cadets (aged 12-13) trained at school for 90 hours annually. 
Senior cadets (14-17) trained for 64 hours in more closely organised night and day 
drills and camps. 18 to 26-year-olds were paid to complete 16 whole day drills in the 
Commonwealth Military Forces. The junior cadet scheme was abolished in 1922 and 
the senior cadets limited to 16-17-year-olds. There existed a range of exemptions, 
particularly for those who lived more than five miles from a training camp, and a 
relatively high degree of non-compliance occurred with at least 34,000 prosecutions 
of a total enlistment of 636,000 for the years 1911-15.  Since there was no 
requirement under the scheme to enter the regular army, the Australian Imperial Force 
in World War One was composed entirely of volunteers.  At the height of World War 
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One, when Australia was under pressure to reinforce its military personnel, the 
government held two referendums, in 1916 and 1917, proposing that it have the 
power to compel citizens to undertake military service overseas, thereby extending its 
home defence rights of conscription. Both referendums were defeated by quite small 
margins of 6 and 16 per cent respectively.4 While the focus was on overseas service, 
it is also likely that the notion of coercive military recruitment did not sit comfortably 
with a voluntary tradition of service in Australia prior to confederation as Kuring has 
noted, “An Australian style of volunteer, part-time, citizen-soldier developed, 





Table 1. Conscription Schemes in Australia, 1911-72 
Following the outbreak of World War Two in 1939, universal compulsory service 
was introduced for unmarried men aged 21.  The call up age and duties were revised 
several times until they were fixed at 18-45, with 18-35 for married men, at the end of 
1941. While this scheme involved military service, rather than just military training, 
the geographic area of deployment was initially limited to Australia and its overseas 
possessions including New Guinea and adjacent Islands, and then in 1943 it was 
extended to include Indonesia, the Philippines, and Japanese-held islands south of the 
equator.6
                                                 
4  National Archives of Australia. Conscription Referendums. Several analyses have been completed 
of voting patterns, for example see Withers, 1916-17 conscription referenda. 
 Home defence again appears to be the principle although the increasingly 
global nature of warfare in the twentieth century may have been implicated in a 
perceived need to deploy Australian troops beyond the nation’s immediate borders. 
5  Kuring, Red Coats to Cams. 
6 Dennis et al eds, Oxford Companion.  
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Compulsory service lapsed at the end of World War Two in 1945.  However, by 
1951 several new sources of international political instability had begun to emerge, 
most notably the increasing tensions following the rise of Communism in south-east 
Asia and the Cold War between the USA and the Soviet Union. The consequences of 
these included the Korean War (1950-3) and the drawn-out Malayan Emergency, both 
of which received military support from Australia during the 1950s.7
 In 1957 there was a major policy shift from universal to selective conscription, 
requiring the enlistment of only a fraction of an age cohort. The mitigated risk of 
major warfare encouraged a focus on fewer but more skilled soldiers who were 
trained in jungle warfare and the handling of machinery. Selection was by ballot, a 
process, as we saw in section 1 above, that had already been used in other nations.
  In response to 
these circumstances, Australia reintroduced universal compulsory military training in 
1951. All 18-year-old men were to complete five years part-time service in the 
Reserve Army in Australia beginning with training for 176 days. 227,000 men served 
in 52 intakes across army, navy and air force until the scheme was abolished in 
November 1959. Evasion rates were low, reflecting perhaps the different age groups 
compared with the pre-World War Two scheme.  Although 1950s conscripts did not 
see active service, in the sense of an intention to engage an enemy, some served on 
naval ships passing through Korean waters during the hostilities, some were present 
during atomic bomb tests, and some worked on aircraft that flew through atomic 
clouds.   
8
                                                 
7 Grey, Military History; Kuring, Red Coats to Cams, chs 7, 8 
 
The procedure used was to select conscripts on the basis of their birth date in the 
8 Australian Prime Minister Billy Hughes had suggested a conscription lottery in 1917 the same year as 
the second referendum on overseas conscription was defeated. Inglis, Conscription in Peace and War 
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calendar year. Two years later conscription was again abandoned but it established the 





2. RECRUITMENT DURING THE VIETNAM WAR 
 
In 1964 Australia significantly increased its commitment to the Vietnam War.  Since 
the foreshadowed manpower needs were believed to be too great to recruit sufficient 
volunteers at short notice, but were below universal obligation levels, selective 
conscription was reintroduced beginning in 1965. This time it was applied to 20-year- 
old males and was restricted to the army.10  Those enlisted were to complete two 
years continuous full-time service in the Regular Army Supplement, followed by 
three years’ part-time service in the Regular Army Reserve.11 These National 
Servicemen (‘Nashos’) could be called to ‘special overseas service’ during their full 
time period, which included combat duty in Vietnam. By the time the scheme was 
terminated in 1972, 63,735 National Servicemen had served in the army12 of whom 
18,654 served in Vietnam13
Following the 1957 innovation, selective conscription was undertaken through a 
lottery. All males were required to register in January or July if their twentieth 
, mostly for a one-year tour of duty, the rest largely 
remained in Australia.  
                                                 
9 Shields, National service training, pp. 67-75 
10  van Gelder, Australia’s selective national service, p. 50. 
11  In October 1971, this was amended to 18 months in full time and 3.5 years in part time service. 
12 Langford, National Service Scheme p. 369. An alternate number: 63,740 is also given in the same 
source p.370. 
13  Authors’ calculations using de-identified data from the Department of Veterans’ Affairs Nominal 
Roll of Vietnam Veterans. The Department advised that the Nominal Roll is considered a work in 
progress and that this figure may change.  The authors understand that any such changes would not 
significantly affect the outcomes of this research. 
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birthday fell in the following six months of that year.  Sixteen biannual lotteries 
occurred over the eight-year period from 1965 to 1972. Lotteries were again drawn by 
date of birth, with the intention of randomising the selection process. The first lottery 
occurred on 10 March 1965. Marbles were placed in a barrel, each marked with a 
different number corresponding in serial order to birth dates in the first half of the 
year. Successive marbles were withdrawn at random until a sufficient numberhad 
been removed to correspond with the estimated manpower needs of the army. 20-year 
olds whose birth date corresponded to one of the drawn marbles were ‘balloted in’ 
and therefore liable to be enlisted in the army.  Those whose birth date was not drawn 
were ‘balloted out’ and were permanently exempted from conscription.  The process 
was then repeated later in the year using a marble for each date in the second half of 
the year. The same procedure was used throughout the eight- year period.14
The new scheme marked some important developments in the principles and 
practice of conscription. The emphasis was now upon service in the regular army 
rather than training in the reserves and it involved an expectation of active service in 
an overseas war. The method of selective conscription had been used briefly in 1957-
9, as noted above, but it was now to be used for these broader purposes and to recruit 
larger numbers. The pros and cons of conscription, the purposes for which it would 
now be used, and the use of the lottery were all widely debated.
   
15
The government was conscious of some of the operational implications in that it 
would put conscripts, often reluctant and only briefly trained, alongside the regular 
army with potential implications for discipline, morale, and combat effectiveness. 
Training recruits for a brief period of service was inefficient and was a drain on the 
   
                                                 
14  More details can be found in Langford, National Service scheme pp. 356-7. 
15  See Edwards, A Nation at War pp20-25 and Hume, Attitudes of political parties. 
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army’s resources.16 An alternative approach, supported by the army as late as 
September 1964, would have been to improve sufficiently the pay and conditions of 
the regular army to recruit an all-volunteer force.17 Initially, this was seen as the most 
likely solution when in June 1964 the Cabinet rejected the introduction of a selective 
national service scheme.18 However, by November it had reversed its thinking and 
introduced a new national service scheme. It argued that it would have been expensive 
and difficult to achieve rapid manpower expansion in the brief time available, 
particularly in a period of full employment.19
Potentially, the biggest drawback of selective conscription was the question of 
fairness; why some should be expected to serve in preference to others. The 1957 
lottery mechanism was revived. Its defence was that it was a form of random 
selection, meaning that the probability, or, more meaningfully, the ‘risk’ of being 
selected for service was equal amongst all 20-year-old males who had not been 
granted an exemption. Minister for Labour and National Service, William McMahon, 
observed, “This has the great virtue of being simple, equitable and easily understood 
by those affected and it does not lend itself to any manipulation”.
 Nor was it likely that appeals to 
patriotism would have much impact on the volunteer rate for an overseas conflict that 
was justified more by the broader geo-strategic implications of the spread of 
Communism than by an immediate challenge to Australian security.  
20
                                                 
16  Forward, Conscription, pp. 86-7. 
  However, critics 
focussed on the inequitable consequences for those balloted in or out rather than the 
equitable process of selection. In a decade of radical thinking and the rise of youth 
17  McNeill, To Long Tan, pp. 23-5. 
18 Sydney Morning Herald 2 June 1964, p. 2. 
19 Forward, Conscription, p. 84. However, Withers, Wage costs, p. 337 argued that sufficient volunteers 
could have been obtained at ‘quite “reasonable” net wage-cost to the government’. His estimate 
amounts to an increase of about five per cent in the defence vote. 
20 Sydney Morning Herald November 12, 1964, p. 9. 
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cultures, these post hoc injustices were coloured with terms like ‘Russian roulette’, 
‘birthday battalions’ and ‘lottery lads’.21
The United States achieved its much larger military commitment to the Vietnam 
War initially through a universal conscription policy that had originated from its entry 
into World War One in 1917 and was based upon selection processes adopted by local 
boards.
  
22 Faced with growing numbers of eligible baby boomers by the early 1960s, it 
had increased the leniency of exemptions.23  However, when President Johnson 
expanded America’s Vietnam commitment later in the decade, it was faced with a 
manpower shortfall and a complex and inconsistent set of exemption practices. The 
discredited system of notional universal obligation was thus replaced by a random 
selection process in the form of a lottery.24 The first Vietnam lottery was held in 
December 1969 for 1970 draftees and was followed by four further annual lotteries 
during the Vietnam War period.25
While using the randomness of dates of birth, it differed from the Australian lottery 
in several notable respects. Rather than simply drawing sufficient dates of birth in the 
lottery to determine who would be ‘balloted in’, the American system attributed a 
number to each birth date in the year in the sequence it was drawn. Thus, the first date 
  The initial lottery covered men born between 1944 
and 1950, while the subsequent lotteries were restricted to those turning 20 in the year 
of their draft.  
                                                 
21 Speech of Federal opposition leader Arthur Calwell reported in Sydney Morning Herald November 
13, 1964, p. 1; Hume, Attitudes, p. 156; Forward, Conscription, p. 106. In 1917 one commentator 
responded to the abortive lottery proposal by referring to it as, “Lives are to be drawn for on Tattersall 
principles ...". Inglis, Conscription in Peace and War, pp. 42-3. 
22 An earlier conscription policy during the American Civil War exempted many professions and 
allowed for an active market in buying substitutes. Baskir and Strauss, Chance and Circumstance, pp. 
17-23. 
23 The age of conscription had been initially set at 21 to 31; by the beginning of the Vietnam War it 
covered 18 to 25 year olds. 
24 Earlier lotteries had been held in 1917-18 and 1940-2 to determine the order of entry of men into the 
wartime military. Fienberg, Randomization. 
25  Although after 1972 no one was drafted and in the following year congressional authority expired. 
Angrist, Lifetime earnings,  p.314 
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drawn would be number one (known as Random Sequence Number (RSN)) and this 
continued through to 366 for each day of the year including 29 February. The lowest 
numbers were called up first and, later in the year, a ceiling was named above which 
there would be no enlistment.  A second ballot on the same day provided a random 
permutation of the 26 letters of the alphabet to determine, by name, which men with 
the same birth date were called up first. The use of RSNs and a name ballot provided 
a degree of ordering absent from the Australian system.26
However, the American system had its faults and critics. This was a single annual 
lottery with a prolonged decision-making process. The lottery linking RSNs to 
particular dates of birth was drawn towards the end of the preceding year, the ceiling 
was first announced in the middle of the year of induction but not confirmed until 
later in the year.
 
27 This meant a lag of up to a year from the ballot results to confirmed 
induction into the army. This lag time, together with the descending probability of 
enlistment as the RSN increased, motivated evasion strategies by those whose 
numbers fell within an uncertain ‘middling’ range.28  The association between RSN 
and date of birth was publicly known, which increased the risk of prejudicial 
treatment in the labour market and attempts to predict the outcome of future ballots. 
In contrast to American practice, the Australian lottery was conducted in private and 
the dates of birth drawn were unpublished until 1997 with the exception of the final 
five ballots.  The main reason for secrecy was to discourage evasive action by those 
who believed, incorrectly, that this information would help them predict the outcome 
of future ballots.29
                                                 
26  Fienberg, Randomization, pp. 255-61. 
  
27  Angrist, The draft lottery pp. 585, 586. 
28  The peak number for induction in the first ballot was 195. 
29  Account of the Administrative Processes, pp. 6-7. 
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In response to criticisms of the degree of randomness of the first ballot, the 
subsequent American lotteries were modified to include multiple stages of 
randomisation (by use of a table of random permutations) and a physical mixing of 
the ‘capsules’ in public view.30  A further criticism of the American ballot was the 
role of local Boards in making additional screening decisions about exemptions and 
deferments. Accusations of nepotism and other forms of corruption resonate with 
concerns about the earlier conscription schemes.31
In total throughout the eight-year period, 804,286 Australian males were registered 
for the ballot.
 
32 This compares to an estimated 868,605 men who turned 20 years of 
age in Australia during this period.33  Published sources do not reveal exactly how 
many were balloted-in. Based on the number of DOBs drawn in each ballot and 
assuming men were distributed uniformly across DOBs within cohorts, we estimate 
that 26% (or 224,706) of men in these cohorts had balloted-in DOBs. However, the 
probability of being balloted in varied considerably between ballots (Table 2).  Thus, 
in the first ballot 96 of a possible 181 birthdates were called, equivalent to 53 per cent. 
This fell to 36 per cent for the second ballot and for most of the war, 1966-70, 
fluctuated between 16 and 26 per cent. Despite not beginning until 1970, a similar 
downward probability trend occurred in the American lotteries, the probability of 
being ‘draft eligible’ declined also from 53 per cent in the first ballot to 34 per cent in 
the second and 26 per cent in the third.34
                                                 
30  Statistical analysis of the first ballot identified a lower probability of call up among the early 
months of the year, which may have been due to the pattern of putting capsules into the deep 
containing jar month by month leaving the earlier months towards the bottom despite mixing. Fienberg, 
Randomization, p. 29. The shape of the capsules themselves, cylindrical with a curve at each end, 
appear physically less suitable for random mixing than the spherical Australian marbles, see the 
following CBS newsclip via: 
  Contemporaries were conscious of these 
http://australianinvolvementinvietnam.wikispaces.com/Conscription 
31 Tarr, By the Numbers. 
32 Langford, National Service Scheme p. 369 
33 Authors’ estimates from Australian Historical Population Statistics, 2008. and Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, Population by age and sex, 2010 
34 Angrist, The draft lottery, p. 586. 
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intertemporal equity issues, one Australian writer noting, “a boy who turned twenty 
between 1 January and 30 June 1965 ran two and half times the risk of being 
conscripted as one who turned twenty between 1 July and 31 December 1966”.35
Such fluctuations in probability reflected the degree of inaccuracy of manpower 
estimates for previous ballots and changes in the nature and intensity of the war. It is 
perhaps not surprising that the largest number of birthdates drawn in an Australian 
ballot occurred in the earliest years of conscription as the government sought to raise 
the army size quite quickly and may have been relatively conservative about its 
manpower needs and inexperienced in forecasting the extent of deferments and 
exemptions.
    
36 As a result, the government found itself with many balloted-in youths 
who were not needed at the time.  They formed part of subsequent call ups thereby 
mitigating the required number of birthdays drawn.  The beginning of the post-World 
War Two baby boom may also have had some impact by raising the cohort size from 
the second half of 1966.37 In the absence of the American numbering system, the 
order in which balloted-in youths were chosen for the current or, indeed, for 
subsequent call ups remains unclear.38  Moreover, the carryover to later enlistment of 
individuals absent from the country at the time of their age group ballot or who had 
previously been granted temporary deferment further reduced the probability of later 
cohorts being balloted in.  It may have been fortuitous for the government that the 
probability of being balloted in declined in the middle years of the war at a time when 
the war’s legitimacy and popular support for it were on the decline.39
                                                 
35 Forward, Conscription, p. 107. 
  Somewhat 
ironically, the balloted-in share spiked to 28-32 per cent in three of the last four 
36 National Archives, Account of the Administrative Processes, p. 14 notes that time constraints meant 
“statistical dissections have had to be kept to barest minimum”. 
37 National Archives, Account of the Administrative Processes, p. 4. 
38 Forward, Conscription, p. 107. 
39 Hamel-Green, Conscription and legitimacy. 
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cohorts (1951-2). Indeed, the percentage of birth dates called for the two 1951 cohorts 
(32 and 28 respectively) and the actual number of men balloted in was higher than 
any previous group excluding those born in 1945. Yet, with the phased withdrawal 
from the war, no conscripts were sent to Vietnam from the last four cohorts.  
 
 
Table 2. Probability of being balloted in. 
Of 224,706 ‘balloted in’ through the period, fewer than 63,735 (28.4 per cent) were 
enlisted into the army, the rest being subject to exemption or deferment.40  As table 3 
indicates, this figure varies over time, with the probability of actual service declining 
as the war progressed. This is a more gradual and continuous decline than we found 
for probability of being balloted in –from 35.9 per cent in the first ballot to 24.1 per 
cent for the thirteenth. The largest share of exemptions (99, 926) were on medical, 
psychological, or educational grounds. The failure rate of the army’s medical 
examinations was high and rising – over 50 per cent by the later years of the war; 
whether this was due to opportunism by those balloted in, sympathetic or 
inexperienced examining doctors, or tougher requirements as the nature of the war 
unravelled is unclear.41 Nor were such exemptions evenly distributed across the 
population, better educated more intelligent men more often avoided service in this 
manner.42
                                                 
40 The figure of 63,735 is from Langford, National Service scheme, p. 369, It refers to all National 
Servicemen. This includes National Servicemen men who were not ‘balloted in’, including men who 
were automatically liable for National Service because they failed to register and men who volunteered 
for National Service. 
  The only occupational exemption was the clergy.  Indefinite deferments 
were granted to married men, volunteers, and serious criminals. Temporary 
41 Langford, National Service scheme, p. 362. Examinations were often undertaken by casually-
employed medical practitioners with limited knowledge of army service expectations. Fett et al 
Australian Veterans Health Studies, p 192. 
42 Avoidance appears to have been greatest among the medical profession, raising suspicions of 
collusion. Fett et al, Australian Veterans Health Studies, Part I, p. 193. 
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deferments were granted largely to students, apprentices and trainees. A sharper 
decline in the remaining three ballots may be related in part to the fact that many 
temporary deferments remained in existence when conscription was abolished.43
 
  
However, it leaves unresolved the question of why, as per table 2, more men were 
balloted in among the 1951 cohorts if there appeared to be a large backlog of potential 
conscripts and a declining need for service in Vietnam. No one was conscripted from 
the final cohort since the Whitlam government came to power and abolished the 
system in December 1972 before the call up date. The small number of ‘balloted-in’ 
army servicemen (325) from the last birth cohort appearing in Table 3 were not 
conscripts. 
 
Table 3. Probability of Enlistment 
The selection of conscripts to serve in Vietnam was a complex decision taken in 
several stages.44
                                                 
43 At December 1972, 15,526 men had been granted or were being assessed for temporary deferment, 
Langford, National Service scheme, p. 370. 
  Conscripts began their service with ten weeks of recruitment 
training in general military skills.  During this period the army allocated each recruit 
to a function-based Corps taking account of observed individual characteristics and 
test results.  Recruits were able to indicate their preferences based on a rather limited 
knowledge of the role and function of each Corp.  However, the army’s manpower 
planning was the major factor in the final decision. Unsurprisingly, there was a degree 
of mismatch between individual preferences and army needs with some corps, 
primarily the Infantry, Artillery, Engineers and Armour, needing far more recruits 
than preferences indicated.  In spite of this mismatch, very few recruits appealed the 
44 Much of the information reported in this paragraph and the next is taken from Fett et al, Australian 
Veterans Health Studies Part I, appendix 9, pp. 196-208 
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decision, probably as a result of peer pressure.45
Following three months Corps training, recruits were then posted to a particular 
service unit. Posting decisions varied between Corps but the proposed deployment of 
their unit largely determined whether the recruit went to Vietnam and, as noted above, 
units in four particular Corps were most likely to go. Individual characteristics could 
still play a role at this stage, those with professional skills sometimes being retained in 
Australia for special projects. Units destined for Vietnam experienced further periods 
of preparatory training including a battle efficiency course at the Jungle Training 
Centre, Canungra. Only if a serviceman passed through these stages would he be sent 
to Vietnam. 
  Significantly, these were the Corps 
in greatest demand in Vietnam, so that Corps allocation had a major bearing on a 
serviceman’s subsequent deployment. Certain Corps, such as engineers and signals, 
required a reasonably high level of intelligence, with the result that those recruits 
closer to average intelligence were more likely to be clustered in the Infantry. 
 
 
Table 4. Probability of National Servicemen serving in Vietnam 
As noted earlier, 18,654 National Servicemen were sent to Vietnam.  Thus, overall, 
National Servicemen faced a 29.3 per cent chance of serving in Vietnam. While it is 
less obvious what the probability of Vietnam service was for the remainder of the 
army, it is significant that only 10 per cent of Australian armed forces were located in 
Vietnam at any one time.46
                                                 
45  Fett et al, Australian Veterans Health Studies Part I, p. 201 
 Again, we find that for Nashos these probabilities varied 
between cohorts (Table 4). The probability rose from about 39 to 53 per cent during 
46  Grey, Military History, p. 249. These figures suggest either that most members of the regular army 




the first three years of cohorts (those born 1945-7), before falling continuously down 
to negligible levels for the final few cohorts (1951-2). The rise in the early years may 
be related to the declining surplus of Regulars available for Vietnam, due to the rising 
total size of the force. As a result, the initial policy that Vietnam units should consist 
of 50 per cent or less National Servicemen was revised in 1968 to man units with 50 




3. THE EXPERIENCE OF WARTIME SERVICE 
 
The historical evidence suggests that the experience of serving in Vietnam was quite 
different from deployment in Australia.48
Many of the main differences between the experience of veterans of Vietnam and 
the majority of servicemen who remained in Australia have been usefully summarised 
in the Australian Veterans Health Study. 
  Moreover, their Vietnam experience was 
sensitive to the timeline of the war itself and the serviceman’s particular role.   
49
                                                 
47  Fett et al Australian Veterans Health Studies, p. 204. The date of change of policy is not clearly 
stated but appears to be about 1968. 
  The key distinction was the nature of 
operations, which in Vietnam involved being constantly prepared, the risk of facing 
combat conditions, and isolation from local society. The social dislocation and stress 
that this implied led to high intakes of alcohol and tobacco and, subsequently, may 
have created difficulties re-integrating into Australian society, particularly in light of 
growing societal opposition to the war. Vietnam veterans were also exposed to 
48 Smaller numbers of Australian servicemen apparently served in other south-east Asian nations 
including Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and Papua-New Guinea. Several hundred Nashos served 
overseas outside Vietnam, mostly in Borneo. Callaghan, Brief History.  Accessed 13.12.2010.  
49 Fett et al, Australian Veterans Health Studies, pp. 208-11. 
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herbicides, insecticides, infectious diseases, and a wildlife and climate that was 
challenging even for Australians.  
Those serving within Australia faced none of these problems.  Boredom and very 
close supervision may have been more salient issues due to the repetition of basic, 
often fastidious, combat preparedness tasks as Ham aptly notes, “ten weeks of 
marching, jogging, ceaseless drill, spitting, polishing, climbing ropes, stripping and 
cleaning rifles...set in treeless, desolate training camps”.50  The principal focus was 
preparedness for service in Vietnam if required, which included attempts to mimic 
these conditions particularly at the Jungle Training Centre at Canungra. Large scale 
practice battles were fought that included the use of armour and artillery. About five 
per cent of each national service intake were identified as potential officers and 
underwent far more intensive training at the Scheyville Officer training unit.51  Some 
men balloted in opted to do their national service in the army reserve (Citizens 
Military Force) in Australia.52 One former reservist describes conditions as similar to 
the regular army in terms of discipline and exercises, which also included imitating 
real battle conditions in Vietnam.53
While it is helpful to distinguish among National Servicemen the experience of 
Veterans against non-Veterans, there was no standard service experience in Vietnam. 
 Whether reservists or full time, though, the 
experience of Australian-based national servicemen bears only limited comparison 
with that of Vietnam veterans.  Tedious and restrictive as domestic national service 
may often have been, it was neither life threatening nor likely to have been associated 
with social dislocation or psychological disturbance. 
                                                 
50 Ham, Australian War, p. 173. 
51 Ham, Australian War, pp. 175-7. 
52 This option was available if the individual was already serving in the CMF at the time he was 
balloted in. Langford, National Service scheme, p. 358. 
53 Email from Joe Davidson, 14 October 2010, Vietnam era reservist and now Honorary Secretary of 
the City of Wollongong sub-Branch of the Returned and Services League. 
21 
 
Their army location and period of service largely determined an individual’s exposure 
to warlike experiences. The infantry stood to endure the most intense combat 
experience through their direct engagement with the opposing forces. Jungle warfare, 
mostly alien to Australian experience and difficult to mimic in training, and with its 
heightened sense of anxiety of surprise attack, was a particular challenge.54 From 
about 1968, the risk of detonating landmines added to the nervousness of the infantry 
troops in these conditions.  Even within an infantry battalion, most soldiers would not 
be involved in direct combat but instead provided supporting and logistical services. 
Frontline rifle companies were rotated for duty. Other army Corps were not so 
directly and dangerously engaged with the enemy particularly signals, ordnance, and 
medical. However, combat engineers fulfilled dangerous functions such as mine 
laying and clearing, while field artillery and tank units also faced combat.55
The Vietnam experience was equally a function of the course of the war, which 
oscillated in the intensity and ferocity of conflict.  The 1st Battalion, Royal Australian 
Regiment, was despatched in May 1965, to serve alongside American troops.  The 
following March it was replaced by a larger taskforce of two battalions, with its own 
support services and specific area of operations at Nui Dat in Phuoc Tuy province, 
south-east of Saigon (now Ho Chi Minh City). The following three years, 1966-9, 
were those of the heaviest involvement by, and greatest risk to, Australian troops.  
This period included the Battle of Long Tan on 18 August 1966, the first significant 
engagement with opposing forces leading to the death of 18 Australians and the 
wounding of a further 24.  At least 245 Vietcong were killed.
 
56
                                                 
54 Although Australian wartime involvement in Korea and in south-east Asia during World War Two 
meant that this type of warfare was not entirely new to Australian forces by the time of Vietnam. 
  
55 The contents of this paragraph are taken from a number of sources that detail the Vietnam experience 
including Ham, Australian War, Fett et al Australian Veterans Health Studies, Kuring, Red Coats to 
Cams. 
56  McNeill, To Long Tan, p. 351. 
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Australian losses, even in the most intense periods of engagement, were relatively 
few but the impact of combat experience may have been profound for those who 
survived. Paul Ham wrote of February 1967, “…that terrible month, during which 
4,600 Australian men participated in or supported actions that changed their lives 
irrevocably. Victory vindicated the losses of Long Tan; yet February left the men in a 
different mood: quieter, sadder…and a hell of a lot older”.57
In March 1967 Australian troops began laying out minefields but were deeply 
shocked by the reaction of the Vietcong who removed many of these mines, up to 6 
000, to create their own fields despite incurring heavy losses as a consequence. From 
mid-1968 to the early 1970s mines were estimated to be responsible for about a half 
of Australian casualties.
 
58  During the Tet offensive of 1968 Communist forces based 
in South Vietnam attacked cities and towns, which included Baria, the capital of 
Phuoc Tuy province.  Several significant battles occurred including attacks on fire 
support bases at Coral and Balmoral in which 23 Australians died.59  While the Tet 
offensive was largely overwhelmed, it created major doubts among American and 
Australian forces about their ability to defeat the Vietcong.60
While there is substantial and detailed information available on the public record 
regarding the course of the war, it seems fair to generalise that the Nashos that served 
in the Infantry in Vietnam between 1966 and 1969 were by far the most at risk. 
 Periodic battles occurred 
in 1969 together with regular pacification operations through ongoing patrolling and 
ambushing. By 1970 there was reduced conflict in the area – the Vietcong made only 
limited attempts to challenge Australian control of the vicinity, sensing the latter’s 
plans to withdraw. 
                                                 
57 Ham, Australian War, p. 295. 
58Murphy, Harvest of Fear, p. 191.. 
59 Grey, Military History, p. 244 
60 Edwards, A Nation at War, p. 193 
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Overall, 198 Nashos died in Vietnam61 constituting 1.1 per cent of National 
Servicemen who served there. Given the time lags in enlistment, training and posting, 
the cohorts balloted in between 1965 and 1968 were the most affected groups. As we 
have seen above, these were the same cohorts for whom the probability of serving 
was greatest. Of National Servicemen who served in Vietnam, those who served in 
the Royal Australian Regiment (RAR) were far more likely to die in service (2.2 per 
cent) than those who served in other units (0.4 per cent). Indeed RAR veterans from 
the first half of the conscription period (born in 1945-1948) account for three quarters 
of all Nasho deaths in Vietnam, whilst more than one quarter of Nasho deaths were 




Table 5. Percentage of men that served as National Servicemen in Vietnam and 





In the twentieth century, the lottery became a common means of supplementing 
military manpower, where the changing nature of warfare, with a strong emphasis on 
capital-intensive technology, frequently mitigated the need for universal obligation 
conscription. This was especially the case in limited regional conflicts, such as 
Vietnam, where both United States and Australia used a lottery system effectively to 
achieve their required levels of manpower.  
                                                 
61 DVA Nominal Roll of Vietnam Veterans. 
62 Authors’ calculations from DVA Nominal Roll of Vietnam Veterans. 
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Selective conscription for full military service in an overseas conflict presents 
particular issues for the legitimacy of conscription.  It was during Vietnam, the so-
called undeclared war, that for the first time large numbers of Australian conscripts 
faced active service beyond Australian territorial borders. The right to conscript for 
home defence had existed since 1903 but extending this to overseas service had been 
rejected by the World War One referendums and resisted by the Curtin Labor 
Government in World War Two. While it has been suggested that in most units no 
one would be forced against their will to serve in Vietnam, many seem to have bowed 
to peer pressure and accepted their overseas posting.63
That a ‘chosen few’ conscripts were to be sent to an overseas battlefield for the 
first time meant that the process of selection was vital to the legitimacy of this policy.  
The aim of the lottery was to achieve random selection in the statistical sense of the 
identical probability of selection within a cohort, in this case of 20-year-old men. This 
conveys a strong sense of fairness and democratic behaviour by treating everyone 
equally, although it should be noted that they were below the normal voting age of 
21.
  Given the growing global 
reach of strategic planning and military action during the twentieth century, the 
distinction between defensive and offensive behaviour blurred so that even defence 
required a more global military deployment.  
64
                                                 
63 Australian Veterans Health Studies, pp. 205-6. Much of the evidence for this report comes from 
commanding officers. Ham, Australian War, pp. 170-1 notes that Nashos had to sign a form 
specifically volunteering for overseas service but also indicates that many conscripts could not recall 
doing so.  
 As was pointed out at the time, however, random also has a more pejorative 
popular meaning in the sense of arbitrariness.  It might be argued that everyone 
should not be treated equally and this was reflected, to a limited degree, in rights of 
deferment or exemption such as the exemption for married men. Some observers 
focussed on the lottery mechanism itself, especially in the United States, that is, 
64  The eligible voting age was reduced to 18 in 1973. 
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whether a physical lottery could ever be perfectly random. The process was modified 
in the United States with multiple layers of randomness introduced after the first 
ballot although this appears not to have been an issue in Australia.65
Where the notion of equal probability and ideas of fairness seem to be most at 
issue, however, was in the changing probability of selection between ballots. In all 
stages – the ballot, enlistment, service in Vietnam – the probability of being selected 
declined significantly from the levels of the earliest years of the war. Overestimation 
of military needs, deferments, absences, and the changing course of the war all help to 
explain this trend. It may have been fortuitous for policy makers that this probability 
of service declined at the same time as support for the war and the accompanying 
policy of selective conscription diminished.  Taken as a whole, 6.3 per cent of the first 
age cohort (first half of 1945) actually served in Vietnam as National Servicemen, 
declining to less than one per cent by the first 1950 birth cohort (Table 5). All of these 
servicemen were liable to suffer potentially profound and lasting consequences from 
the experience of wartime service, particularly the small fraction of their number who 
actually faced a combat situation. 
 The order of 
enlistment and deployment decisions subsequent to the Australian ballot itself appear 
to have been based upon a set of complex and often translucent criteria including 
appropriateness of skills and individual preferences rather than random selection. 
Irrespective of whether the Vietnam-War era conscription ballots provided a fair 
and equitable method of military recruitment, they offer an opportunity to study the 
causal effects of service. The current paper forms part of the early stages of a broader 
project that utilises the ballot’s natural experiment properties to investigate the effect 
                                                 
65  Our analysis of the Australian conscription ballot outcomes reveals no significant tendency for 
dates from earlier or later months to be more likely to be balloted in (results not shown). Close to 3000 
individual dates of birth were included in the lotteries and in our analysis. 
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66  For comparable work on the US, see Angrist, Lifetime earnings; Angrist, Draft lottery; Angrist and 
Chen, Long-term economic consequences.  
27 
 

































Universal Junior cadets (JC): 
12-13 
Senior cadets (SC): 





Training JC: 90 hours 
per year 
SC: 64 hours 
per year (four 
whole day 
drills, 12 half 
day drills, 24 
night drills) 
CMF: 96 hours 
annually (16 
whole day 
drills not less 




















Universal Unmarried men 
turning 21 in year 
ending 30 June; 
July 1940, 
extended to single 
males to 24 years; 
December 1940, 
extended to single 
males to 33 years; 
December 1941, 
single men 18-45, 
married men, 18-35 
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18 Training 176 days (98 
full time 
training, 
remainder on a 
part time basis 
over three years 
with CMF).  
Reduced to 140 

















Selective 20-year-olds, but 
liability could 
remain till 26 and 
30 in some cases 





two years full 
time military 
service, plus 
three years in 
Regular Army 
(RA) Reserve. 
18 months full 
time service 













18 654 served 
in Vietnam 
 
Sources: Australian War Memorial, 53rd Battalion, West Sydney Regiment, 
http://www.awm.gov.au/units/unit_11966.asp, accessed 24.8.2010; Forward, 
Conscription; Inglis, Conscription in Peace; Langford, National service scheme; DVA 
Nominal Roll of Vietnam Veterans; “Conscription” in Dennis et al Oxford 
Companion. Accessed 30.7.2010; State Library of South Australia, Conscription & 




Table 2. Probability of being balloted in by birth cohort 
 
 
number of days in cohort 
 
birth cohort days out days in 
Percent  of birth 
dates balloted in 
by cohort 
1945.1 85 96 53 
1945.2 117 67 36 
1946.1 134 47 26 
1946.2 146 38 21 
1947.1 137 44 24 
1947.2 145 39 21 
1948.1 136 46 25 
1948.2 149 35 19 
1949.1 130 51 28 
1949.2 154 30 16 
1950.1 151 30 17 
1950.2 143 41 22 
1951.1 123 58 32 
1951.2 132 52 28 
1952.1 131 51 28 
1952.2 142 42 23 
 















1945.1 8,920 24830 35.9 
1945.2 5,752 16786 34.3 
1946.1 3,878 12361 31.4 
1946.2 3,816 12175 31.3 
1947.1 4,179 13819 30.2 
1947.2 3,429 11555 29.7 
1948.1 4,117 13518 30.5 
1948.2 3,231 10291 31.4 
1949.1 4,353 14764 29.5 
1949.2 2,648 8982 29.5 
1950.1 2,597 9234 28.1 
1950.2 3,407 12830 26.6 
1951.1 4,302 17851 24.1 
1951.2 3,511 16082 21.8 
1952.1 2,462 16004 15.4 
1952.2 325 13625 2.4 
Overall 60927 224706 27.1 
 
Note: Available databases do not identify all National Servicemen who remained in 
Australia, so we cannot determine the proportion of balloted-in men who were 
conscripted by cohort. However, this can be approximated by calculating the 
proportion of men with balloted-in birthdays who served in the army. Most army 
servicemen with balloted-in birthdays were National Servicemen and most National 
Servicemen had dates of birth which were balloted in (see the discussion in Siminski, 
2010).  
Source: Authors’ estimates from an (unpublished and de-identified) Vietnam-War era 
Database of military personnel records obtained from the Australian Institute of 
Health and Welfare, combined with Australian Bureau of Statistics (2008). Australian 
Historical Population Statistics, 2008. Canberra: ABS Cat. No. 3105.0.65.001 and 









Balloted-in Army Vietnam 
servicemen  




1945.1 3,517 39.4 
1945.2 2,351 40.9 
1946.1 1,724 44.5 
1946.2 1,939 50.8 
1947.1 2,052 49.1 
1947.2 1,811 52.8 
1948.1 1,956 47.5 
1948.2 1,355 41.9 
1949.1 1,571 36.1 
1949.2 683 25.8 
1950.1 421 16.2 
1950.2 210 6.2 
1951.1 158 3.7 
1951.2 96 2.7 
1952.1 30 1.2 
1952.2 2 0.6 
Overall 19876                                              32.6 
 
See notes for Table 3.  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from an (unpublished and de-identified) VietnamWar 
era Database of military personnel records obtained from the Australian Institute of 
Health and Welfare, combined with data from the Nominal Roll of Vietnam Veterans, 





Table 5. Percentage of men that served as National Servicemen in Vietnam and 














1945.1     46,816  2,952 6.3 53 
1945.2     46,099  2,139 4.6 20 
1946.1     47,601  1,629 3.4 18 
1946.2     58,953  1,897 3.2 29 
1947.1     56,847  2,010 3.5 12 
1947.2     54,517  1,836 3.4 21 
1948.1     53,483  1,912 3.6 21 
1948.2     54,103  1,422 2.6 14 
1949.1     52,397  1,521 2.9 7 
1949.2     55,091  698 1.3 0 
1950.1     55,709  408 0.7 1 
1950.2     57,578  125 0.2 2 
 
Source: Cohort sizes are authors’ estimates from Australian Bureau of Statistics 
(2008) and Australian Bureau of Statistics, Population by age and sex, 2010. National 
Servicemen served in Vietnam are from the Nominal Roll of Vietnam Veterans. In 
addition to those included in the table, there were 71 older and 33 younger National 
Servicemen who served in Vietnam, who presumably volunteered for National 
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